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Note
Lessons in Confronting Racist Speech: Good
Intentions, Bad Results, and Article 4(a) of the
Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination
Michael A. G. Korengoc
Dese boys be sayin' that we be comin' here to Dartmut an' not takin'
the classics. You know, Homa.
The Dartmouth Review1
For the white man to ask the black man if he hates him is just like
the rapist asking the raped, or the wolf asking the sheep, "Do you
hate me?" Our enemy is the white man! Oh, yes, that devil is our
enemy.
Malcolm X 2
Racist expression or "hate speech" is a profoundly degrad-
ing and disturbing manifestation of racial tension, particularly
when used as a tool of persecution. Racist speech, however,
also can be an effective and sometimes necessary means of de-
picting the racial and social subjugation of one group by an-
other. In their efforts to silence hate speech, governmental
bodies throughout the world continually explore new legisla-
tive approaches to combat it. These attempts, however, almost
completely disregard politically-motivated racist speech, and in-
evitably intrude upon an individual's right to express herself.
The United Nations adopted Article 4 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination3 as a
means of eradicating the manifestations of racial hatred-
namely, racist speech and propaganda. Section (a) of Article 4
binds the Racial Discrimination Convention's signatories to en-
act legislation prohibiting all dissemination of ideas based on
1. Jon Wiener, Reagan's Children: Racial Hatred on Campus, 248 NA-
TION 260 (1989).
2. As told to ALEx HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 241
(1964).
3. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Dec. 21, 1965, art. 4, para. a., 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 220 (1969) [hereinafter Racial
Discrimination Convention].
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racial superiority or hatred and punishing any person who in-
cites another to racial discrimination.4
A great number of countries have responded to Article 4(a)
with legislation that reflects its language and purpose. Evaluat-
ing Article 4(a) in light of its subsequent application, however,
reveals Article 4(a)'s two principal shortcomings: Article 4(a)
invites inconsistent interpretations and its prohibitions directly
conflict with principles of free expression.
This Note explores the ways in which Article 4(a) fails to
provide an effective guide for international legislation and, ulti-
mately, compromises a fundamental human value-free expres-
sion. For these reasons, this Note argues that governmental
bodies should avoid complying with Article 4(a). Instead, Arti-
cle 4(a) should be modified to strike a proper balance between
free expression and protection from racist hate speech.
Part I of this Note briefly traces the background of Article
4(a) and exposes its troublesome aspects through an examina-
tion of the United Kingdom's statutory and jurisprudential ex-
perience with the article. Part II offers a view of racist speech
that links it to other forms of radical expression integral to a
diverse democracy. Part III suggests specific modifications to
Article 4(a) that appropriately balance an individual's right to
express herself and restrictions on racially-motivated hate
speech. This Note concludes that Article 4(a), so modified,
should be used as a model racist speech law.5
I. ARTICLE 4(a)
The systematic genocide practiced during World War II
caused the international community to recognize the necessity
4. Id.
5. This Note is limited to an examination of Article 4(a) and laws that
comply with its provisions; hopefully, it will contribute to an understanding of
how racist speech regulation can work in any context. Although the United
States's experience is outside the scope of this Note, the significant debate in
this country regarding the constitutionality of racist speech laws, and the best
approach to regulating such conduct must be acknowledged. An exhaustive
list of authors is impractical, but the following works have contributed greatly
to this discussion: Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitu-
tional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343 (1991); Charles R. Law-
rence III, Acknowledging the Victim's Cry, ACADEME, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 10;
Robert Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 267 (1991); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech;
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2332 (1974). In addition, the
United States Supreme Court recently examined racist speech regulation in
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.Ct. 2538 (1992).
[Vol. 77:719
SRACIST SPEECH
of enacting positive measures to prevent its reoccurrence. 6 This
manifestation of racism shocked the world and provided the
catalyst for the proliferation of national anti-discrimination leg-
islation. National legislation, however, was far from effective.
The rash of anti-semitic incidents in Europe during the 1960's
demonstrated the inadequacies of relying on nations to enact
effective legislation.7 Pressure to create internationally binding
legislation mounted.8
A. THE ADOPTION AND DRAFTING OF ARTICLE 4(A)
International desire to prohibit incitement to racial hatred
and discrimination gained momentum after the genocide in
Nazi Germany was revealed. The United Nations led the effort
to adopt internationally binding legislation against racist
speech.9 To implement this policy, the U.N. adopted the Racial
Discrimination Convention, which came into effect on January
4, 1969.10 It directed the Committee on the Elimination of Ra-
6. NATAN LERNER, GRouP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 45-46 (1991); see also Thomas D. Jones, Article 4 of the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
and the First Amendment, 23 How. L.J. 429, 436 (1980).
7. LERNER, supra note 6, at 45-46. This pattern of anti-semitism became
known as the "swastika epidemic." Id.
8. I& Many countries of the Third World supported the call for United
Nations legislation, viewing it as an opportunity for increased protection of
their national identities. Id at 46.
9. As early as 1949, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights considered,
though ultimately rejected, an article prohibiting incitement to violence on ra-
cial, national or religious grounds. Matsuda, supra note 5, at 2342 n.108.
10. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 3. The United Nations
adopted the Racial Discrimination Convention 106 votes to zero, with only
Mexico abstaining. LERNER, supra note 6, at 47. Mexico later changed its ab-
stention to an affirmative vote. Id.
Drafting of the Racial Discrimination Convention began in 1960. LERNER,
supra note 6, at 46. That year, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
a resolution condemning all manifestations of racial, national, and religious ha-
tred as violating both the U.N.'s Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the U.N. Charter itself. Id Resolution 1510 (XV) was passed on December 12,
1960. Id. See generally Jones, supra note 6, at 438-42; W.M. Reisman, Re-
sponses to Crimes of Discrimination and Genocide: An Appraisal of the Con-
vention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 1 J. INT'L LAW & POL'Y
29, 43-48 (1971). The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities proposed that an international convention outlawing
racial discrimination be drafted and submitted to the U.N. signatories. See
Egon Schwelb, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, 15 INT'L COmP. L.Q. 996, 997-98 (1966).
In 1962 the U.N. passed a resolution proclaiming its intent to draft a con-
vention on the elimination of racial discrimination and hatred. G.A. Res. 1780,
U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 17th Sess., 1187th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRes/1780
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cial Discrimination to implement the Convention.1'
Article 4(a) provides:
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which
are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of
persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or
promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake
to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all in-
citement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due
regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of
(1962). One year later, the U.N. proclaimed the Declaration on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. G.A. Res. 1904, U.N. GAOR 3d
Comm., 18th Sess., 1261st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/1904 (1963). On the
same day it proclaimed the Declaration, the General Assembly asked the
Human Rights Commission to prepare an international Convention that would
be binding on all ratifying countries. G.A. Res. 1906, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm.,
18th Sess., 1261st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Ras/1906 (1963).
By 1964 the Sub-Commission had drafted a proposal consisting of ten arti-
cles and a preamble and sent it to the Commission on Human Rights. LERNER,
supra note 6, at 47. The Commission on Human Rights adopted the substan-
tive provisions of the Sub-Commission's recommendations. Id. The Economic
and Social Council added a U.S.-proposed article on anti-semitism as well as
articles concerning the Convention's implementation, before submitting the
proposal to the Third Committee on July 30, 1964. Id
Finally, the Third Committee adopted a proposal excluding reference to
specific forms of hatred or discrimination. I&. The proposal, submitted by
Greece and Hungary, ameliorated the controversy surrounding the article on
anti-semitism. I& Specific reference to apartheid, the system of racial dis-
crimination and segregation practiced in South Africa, however, was not elimi-
nated. LERNER, supra note 6, at 52. Despite this remaining ambiguity, the
Third Committee submitted its report to the General Assembly. Id at 47.
As of 1990, 128 countries have ratified the Convention, including all major
powers except the United States and Japan. Id. at 45. Although the United
States signed the Racial Discrimination Convention on September 28, 1966, the
U.S. did not ratify the Convention and therefore is not bound by its dictates.
NATAN LERNER, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FoRMs
OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 200 (1980).
11. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 3, arts. 8-15, 660
U.N.T.S. at 224-34. The Racial Discrimination Convention consists of a Pream-
ble and 25 articles divided into three parts. Part I includes definitions of racial
discrimination and the signatories' obligations; part I's provisions concern the
implementation of the Convention; and part Ill consists of final clauses. LER-
NER, supra note 6, at 47.
Article 1 defines racial discrimination as "any distinction, exclusion, re-
striction or preference based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic ori-
gin [which impairs] human rights and fundamental freedoms." Racial
Discrimination Convention, supra note 3, art. 1, 660 U.N.T.S. at 216. The term
"national origin" created a problem of interpretation. Some drafters believed
it should be limited to the citizens or holders of passports issued by a state,
others believed it should include groups bound by a common ethnicity, heri-
tage, or culture. LERNER, supra note 6, at 49.
Article 3 condemns racial segregation; Article 5 enumerates fundamental
rights that states must protect, such as freedom of speech. Racial Discrimina-
tion Convention, supra note 3, arts. 3, 5, 660 U.N.T.S. at 218-22.
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Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this
Convention, inter alia;
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of
ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial dis-
crimination, as well as acts of violence or incitement to such acts
against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic ori-
gin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, includ-
ing the financing thereof.12
Application of Article 4(a)'s incitement and dissemination
provisions raises different concerns. The dissemination provi-
sion concerns solely the speaker's conduct; dissemination is ille-
gal even if no one receives the message. Alternatively, the
incitement provision looks to the listener's violent or discrimi-
natory reaction to the racist speech.1 3 Both provisions reflect
the drafters' collective attempt to prohibit racist expression
before any violence or racial discrimination actually occurs.14
12. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 3, art. 4, para. a., 660
U.N.T.S. at 220. The rest of Article 4 provides that State Parties:
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organ-
ized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite ra-
cial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such
organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law;
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national
or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.
I&, para. b., c., 660 U.N.T.S. at 220-21.
13. This Note defines an act of racial discrimination as one legitimately
proscribable by the state, such as bias-motivated assault.
14. This preemptive approach goes to the heart of the tension between a
state's legitimate desire to prevent violence and its desire to protect free ex-
pression, despite free expression's potential to provoke violence. See LERNER,
supra note 10, at 51.
The adoption of the Racial Discrimination Convention bound the ratifying
states, within their legal and constitutional frameworks, to implement its dic-
tates. Unless a nation submitted a reservation to Article 4(a), ratification com-
pelled it to enact Article 4(a)'s specific provisions. A number of countries that
the Committee judged to be in compliance with the dictates of Article 4(a) had
preexisting legislation that met the Committee's criteria. For example, Upper
Volta submitted to the Committee the text of three 1959 laws which together
satisfied the requirements of Article 4(a). U.N. COMM. ON THE ELIMINATION
OF RACIAL DIscRIMINATION, PosrrIVE MEASURES DESIGNED TO ERADICATE ALL
INCITEMENT TO, OR AcTs OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, Agenda Item 24, at 6,
U.N. Doc. CERD/2, U.N. Sales No. E.85.XIV.2 (1986). Yugoslavia demon-
strated compliance with Article 4(a) by its Constitutional provisions on dis-
semination and incitement, which also were codified in its 1977 Criminal Code.
Id, Agenda Item 26, at 6. Zaire demonstrated its pre-existing compliance with
a 1966 law imposing penalties for all forms of discrimination including incite-
ment, propaganda, and financing. I&, Agenda Item 32, at 7.
Several other countries responded to the Racial Discrimination Conven-
tion by amending previously existing legislation to meet the requirements of
Article 4(a). These countries include France, India, Iran, Senegal, and the So-
viet Union. Id&, Agenda Items 41-62, at 9-14. For example, France ratified the
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All in all, Article 4 was "one of the most difficult and con-
troversial [provisions] of the [Racial Discrimination] Conven-
tion.115 Several delegates considered Article 4(a) regressive
and believed it could not be squared with United Nations
guaranties of free expression.16 Ultimately, many of the con-
vention's signatories-particularly those who opposed the dis-
semination provision-ratified the convention with specific
reservations to Article 4(a).17
Convention on July 28, 1971; one year later it passed the Act of July 1, 1972
which amended 1881 legislation to prohibit defamation and insults on account
of race, ethnic group, nation, or religion and to prohibit persons from "in-
cit[ing] discrimination, hatred or violence" based on such characteristics. Id.,
Agenda Item 41, at 9-10.
In what is perhaps the best example of full compliance, the Netherlands
responded to the Racial Discrimination Convention by amending the Nether-
lands Penal Code to fine anyone publicly expressing views "insulting to other
persons or groups on account of their race, religion or conviction." Id., Agenda
Item 39, at 9.
Some countries passed legislation presumably to comply with Article 4(a),
but did not meet the Committee's criteria. For example, in contemplation of
signing the Racial Discrimination Convention, Finland enacted legislation
which adequately implemented the dissemination provision, but not the provi-
sion on incitement. Id., Agenda Items 35-40, at 8-9.
15. LERNER, supra note 10, at 43. The text was "the outcome of a difficult
compromise after hours, and even days, of discussion, drafting and redrafting."
Id. at 47 (quoting statement of Mr. Lamptey, a delegate from Ghana).
16. Id. Some representatives objected to any regulation of expression. Id.
17. Article 20(2) permits reservations to the Convention provided they are
not "incompatible with [its] object and purpose." Racial Discrimination Con-
vention, supra note 3, 660 U.N.T.S. at 236. As of 1980, twelve countries had
submitted reservations to Article 4. LERNER, supra note 14, at 156-62. For ex-
ample, although Australia ratified the Racial Discrimination Convention in
1975, it did so with a reservation to Article 4. AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION, INCITEMENT TO RACIAL HATRED: THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERI-
ENCE, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 2 1 (1982) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS PAPER
No. 2]. Hence, it is not illegal in Australia to incite others to racial discrimina-
tion or to disseminate ideas advocating racial discrimination or violence. Id
Some of the reservations appeared to conflict with post-World War II trea-
ties binding various nations to prohibit fascist organizations' propaganda. See
Schwelb, supra note 10, at 1054; Raisman, supra note 10, at 49.
The United States submitted a reservation that may ensure that the U.S.
Supreme Court can follow the U.S. Constitution in the event that there is a
conflict between Article 4(a) and the First Amendment. Jordan J. Paust, Re-
reading the First Amendment in Light of Treaties Proscribing Incitement to
Racial Discrimination or Hostility, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 565, 567-68 (1991).
But see Jones, supra note 6, at 457-58 (arguing that a reservation is unneces-
sary since only an absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment would
protect speech that Article 4(a) condemns).
Some countries made general, superfluous reservations to Article 4, often
simply reiterating the limitations contained in the Article itself. For example,
the United Kingdom restated the Article's provision that all laws passed in
contemplation of Article 4 would be drafted "with due regard to the principles
[Vol. 77:719
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II. ARTICLE 4(a)'s CONTROVERSIAL PROVISIONS
The United Kingdom's experience in enacting legislation
complying with Article 4(a) is instructive.1 8 The British Race
Relations Act addresses the same issues as Article 4(a) and
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and expressly set
forth in article 5 of the Racial Discrimination Convention." LERNER, supra
note 10, at 157-60.
18. For legislative bodies in the United States, the United Kingdom's his-
tory is particularly useful given the cultural, historical, and political identity
between the two countries.
Great Britain's legislative initiatives in the area of regulating racist speech
began with Section 5 of the Public Order Act of 1936, which was specifically
enacted to wipe out the British Union of Fascists. HUMAN RIGHTS PAPER No.
2, supra note 17, at 4 n.6. Section 5 of the Public Order Act provides that
"[a]ny person who in any public place or at any public meeting uses threaten-
ing, abusive or insulting words or behaviours with intent to provoke a breach
of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall
be guilty of an offence." Jordan v. Burgoyne, All E.R. 225, 227 (1963); see also
David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDozo L. REV. 445, 498-
99 (1987).
The movement to criminalize racist speech gained prominence in the early
1960's. HUMAN RIGHTS PAPER No. 2, supra note 17, at 4. In 1963, when Parlia-
ment revised the Public Order Act, the Conservative government proposed,
but ultimately rejected, a clause prohibiting incitement to racial hatred. Id, In
the following year's election, however, the Labour Party campaigned on this
issue and pledged to criminalize speech intended or likely to cause racial ha-
tred or public disorder. Id.
Ultimately Parliament amended the Public Order Act by enacting section
6 of the Race Relations Act of 1965, a comprehensive attempt to control the
vestiges and manifestations of racial discrimination throughout the U.K. Id. at
4-6. Section 6(1) of the Race Relations Act of 1965 provides:
A person shall be guilty of an offence under this section if, with in-
tent to stir up hatred against any section of the public in Great Britain
distinguished by colour, race or ethnic or national origins
(a) he publishes or distributes written matter which is threaten-
ing, abusive or insulting; or
(b) he uses in any public place or at any public meeting words
which are threatening, abusive, or insulting, being matter or words
likely to stir up hatred against that section on grounds of colour, race
or ethnic or national origins.
Race Relations Act, 1965, ch. 73, § 6(1) (Eng.). A person convicted under the
Race Relations Act faces a maximum sentence of two years imprisonment.
Id., § 6(3). The statute, however, requires the Attorney General's consent to
any prosecutions under the law, ostensibly as an added safeguard protecting
against intrusions into free expression. Id; see also, Jones, supra note 6, at
468-69.
Although the United Kingdom deposited its document of ratification with
the Committee on March 7, 1969, it had criminalized racial hatred four years
earlier with the passage of the Race Relations Act. LERNER, supra note 10,
Appendix 4 at 247. Even before passage of the Act, however, courts used the
common law to restrict racist hate speech. For example, causes of action for
libel and defamation provided common avenues for relief. HUMAN RIGHTS PA-
PER No. 2, supra note 17, at 4; see also Jones, supra note 6, at 467-68.
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complies with its requirements, although it is not identical.19
The most significant distinction between the two is that the
British law does not punish pure expression; rather, it punishes
incitement only. While Article 4(a) prohibits "all dissemination
of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred,120 the Race Rela-
tions Act punishes only that dissemination which is "likely to
stir up hatred" on the basis of race, color, ethnicity, or national
origin.21
Under British law the boundaries of the incitement provi-
sion are broader than those in Article 4(a). Article 4(a) prohib-
its only incitement to racial discrimination or to acts of
violence, whereas the Race Relations Act prohibits incitement
to racial hatred. The distinction is in the proscribed result: ha-
tred is a feeling and, thus, more difficult for a court to evaluate
than discrimination, which requires a specific act.2 2
B. THE INCITEMENT AND DISSEMINATION PROVISIONS
During Article 4(a)'s drafting process, the incitement and
dissemination provisions caused the most contention. The
United Nation's focus on incitement to racial discrimination
instead of incitement to racial hatred saved the incitement pro-
vision from intolerably compromising free expression.23
19. Great Britain submitted a reservation to Article 4(a) when it ratified
the Convention in 1969. See supra note 17; Jones, supra note 6, at 471. Some
scholars conclude that the British representative believed the reservation
championing principles of free expression was completely consistent with
Great Britain's Race Relations Act. I&.
20. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 3, art. 4, para. a, 660
U.N.T.S. at 220.
21. Race Relations Act, 1965, ch. 73, § 6(1) (Eng.). As is detailed below,
however, courts overlook the Act's requirement that the speech be likely to
stir up racial hatred; in doing so they effectively ban all dissemination of racist
messages, however unlikely that hatred will result. See infra notes 27-28 and
accompanying text.
22. The Race Relations Act of 1965 contained a mens rea requirement: to
be punished, the speaker must have intended to "stir up hatred." Race Rela-
tions Act, 1965, ch. 73, § 6(1) (Eng.). See also Jones, supra note 6, at 468-69.
When Parliament amended the 1965 Act by enacting the Race Relations Act of
1976, it deleted the intent requirement. See LERNE , supra note 10, at 198;
HUMAN RIGHTS PAPER No. 2, supra note 17, at 8. Under the Act as it stands, it
is an offense to use racially-based hate speech, or to publish or distribute mate-
rial where hatred is likely to be stirred up on the basis of race, regardless of
the actor's subjective intent. LERNER, supra note 10, at 199. The word
"likely" is not defined.
23. Two drafts of the initial incitement provision were submitted at the
start of discussion by the United Nations Human Rights Commission. One
prohibited incitement to "racial hatred;" the other, to "racial discrimination."
LERNER, supra note 10, at 44. The Commission adopted the latter, diffusing
[Vol. 77:719
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Prohibiting incitement to racial hatred would punish a person
for causing another to hate, a result which is dangerously close
to prohibiting the thought or feeling of hatred itself. Criminal-
ization of a specific thought or feeling is precisely the type of
viewpoint regulation that compromises the right to free expres-
sion.24 The Commission made a crucial distinction between a
state's power to punish acts and its power to punish thoughts or
feelings.25
The most significant problem in applying Article 4(a)'s in-
citement provision is determining whether incitement actually
will result in racial discrimination. The crux of this problem is
identifying a causal relationship between the expression and
the resulting discrimination.26 Balancing the value of free ex-
pression against the state's interest in protecting its citizens
from discrimination requires that a speaker only be punished
when the threat of resulting discrimination is great and imme-
diate. Achieving this balance requires assessing the causal rela-
tionship between the speech (the inciting force) and the
resulting discrimination (the proscribed act). Temporal and
spatial proximity between the inciting force and the proscribed
act may be indicators of causality. As the probability that cer-
tain speech will give rise to discrimination decreases, the state's
interest in proscribing the speech decreases and the rules of de-
bate, not the force of law, should be trusted to protect potential
the chief objection that courts were incapable of measuring hatred. Prohibit-
ing "incitement to racial discrimination" requires courts to determine only
whether one person has illegally discriminated against another. By tying ex-
pression to a result within the state's police power to prohibit, Article 4(a)'s
incitement provision aims at the resulting violence or discrimination and not
the expression itself, thus protecting free expression. See Kretzmer, supra
note 18 at 497.
24. In addition to its implications for free expression, this result is prob-
lematic because it would be difficult to determine whether incitement caused
hatred, or something short of hatred, such as "ill-will, hostility or contempt."
AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, INCITEMENT TO RACIAL HATRED:
THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERiENCE, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 123 (1982) [herein-
after HUMAN RIGHTS PAPER No. 1].
25. That is not to say, however, the prohibition on incitement to racial dis-
crimination as stated in Article 4(a) implicates no free expression values. But
under a literal reading, the provision threatens free expression only if inter-
preted to punish the speaker when there was in fact no likelihood of resulting
racial discrimination.
26. This was an issue evaluated and debated when Article 4(a) was
drafted. Some representatives argued that the proposed language "likely to
cause" was problematic because it gave broad discretion to those applying the
law. LERNER, supra note 10, at 44.
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listeners.2
Article 4(a)'s incitement provision is less susceptible to bla-
tant viewpoint discrimination than that of the Race Relations
Act provision because it more precisely defines the acts that the
speech must provoke.28 Of course, an aggressive court still
might interpret Article 4(a)'s incitement provision broadly and
circumvent its causality standard. A court unwilling to apply
the words of the provision faithfully might punish, for example,
27. Moreover, one must conclude that racial hatred constitutes a real
threat to the public peace to justify its criminalization. See HUMAN RIGHTS PA-
PER No. 2, supra note 17, at 26. This belief formed the basis for the Race Rela-
tions Act, which targets only expression that "over a period of time engenders
the hate which begets violence." Id at 6 (quoting Sir F. Soskice, British Secre-
tary of State, addressing the House of Commons).
Many courts have disregarded the fact that no racial discrimination or vio-
lence resulted from the defendant's racist speech. Though exceptions exist, if
racial discrimination does not result, the likelihood of it occuring was not
great. For example, in The Queen v. Relf, a British court acknowledged that
the defendent's behavior did not provoke disorder. 1 Cr. App. Rep. Sentencing
111 (Eng. C.A. 1979) (LEXIS, Intlaw library, UK case file). The court none-
theless upheld his 15 month sentence, although suspending the final six
months. Id
Relf was punished because he attempted to stir up racial hatred, even
though he failed. See HUMAN RIGHTS PAPER No. 2, supra note 17, at 7. This
result raises the issue of the intent of Article 4(a)'s drafters. Did Article 4(a)'s
framers intend to prohibit discrimination by preventing people from advocat-
ing it, or did they seek to punish those advocating discrimination regardless of
the likelihood that it would occur? Delegates to the Human Rights Commis-
sion argued both sides of the issue. See, e.g., LERNER, supra note 10, at 44-45.
The Ref court did not consider whether Relf's incitement was capable of
causing others to breach the peace. In fact, the listeners' decision not to retali-
ate suggests that Relf's speech fell far short of creating a potential for vio-
lence, public disorder, or even racial hatred.
Moreover, the Ref court demonstrated its willingness to dispense with a
causality test, for it seemed apparent that Relf would not be likely to stir up
racial hatred; instead, the court upheld Relf's conviction because of the view-
point he expressed. At one point the court explicitly acknowledged its reason-
ing, stating that "constant repetition of lies might in the end lead some people
into thinking that the lies are true. It is a matter of recent history that the
constant repetition of lies in Central Europe led to the tragedy which came
about in the years 1939 to 1945." Relf, 1 Cr. App. Rep. Sentencing at 111.
28. A famous prosecution under the Race Relations Act of 1965 demon-
strates the statute's susceptibility to viewpoint discrimination. Michael Abdul
Malik, a West Indies native, was prosecuted for verbally attacking whites. The
Queen v. Malik, [1968] 1 W.L.R. 353 (Eng. C.A.). Malik spoke in front of sev-
enty to eighty people, stating: "I want to tell you about souls. The black man
has soul. The white man has no soul. He is a soulless person.... I have been
to prison. At first I was terrified but it is a coloured man's job to go to prison.
You get to know a lot in prison, a lot that can terrify the white man." Id at
583-84. Malik demonstrates the Race Relations Act's applicability to a mem-
ber of a historically disenfranchised racial group.
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a racist's written appeal even though the appeal was unlikely to
induce discrimination. Nevertheless, courts are far less likely
to apply incitement provision to punish a speaker because of
her viewpoint. After all, to punish a speaker for her viewpoint,
a court need only turn to Article 4(a)-based prohibitions on all
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred.29
The dissemination component potentially compromises free ex-
pression in two ways: first, because its vague terminology al-
lows courts to use the provision to discriminate against
minority viewpoints;3 0 and second, by prohibiting racist expres-
sion deserving of protection because of its societal value.3 '
B. ARTICLE 4(a) CREATES THE POTENTIAL FOR UNEVEN AND
DISCRIMINATORY APPLICATION OF THE LAW
Possibly the most troubling aspect of Article 4(a)'s dissemi-
nation provision is its susceptibility to viewpoint discrimination,
since the state must choose to prosecute speakers under the
provision. This prosecutorial discretion, which results from the
need to evaluate the content of the speech to determine
whether Article 4(a)'s prohibition on dissemination is applica-
ble, has troubling consequences.3 2 Racist speech by a member
of a historically-victimized minority may be silenced because of
its potentially explosive consequences, while racist expression
by a member of a dominant, historically powerful group could
be overlooked as little more than a harmless irritation.33
29. As discussed above, Article 4(a) requires state parties to "declare an
offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority
or hatred." Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 3, art. 4, para. a, at
220. The votes on this provision were the most highly contested of any during
the drafting process. LERNER, supra note 10, at 46.
30. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text. A literal interpretation
of Article 4(a) would criminalize publication of a racist, yet historically signifi-
cant book such as Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf, even if meant for a German or
European history course. Dissemination of Mein Kampf would certainly vio-
late Article 4(a) because its main themes are racial superiority and hatred. See
ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF (Ralph Manheim trans., 1943).
32. The potential for abuse is greater in applying the dissemination provi-
sion than the incitement provision because the dissemination provision re-
quires prosecutors and courts to evaluate the message's content, whereas with
incitement, the court need only focus on the likelihoood that the message will
incite others to racial discrimination or violence. See supra note 23.
33. Chances are small that a public official applying an Article 4(a) law
will be from a politically disenfranchised group. The prosecution of Michael
Abdul Malik, The Queen v. Malik, [1968] 1 W.L.R., 353 (Eng. C.A.), illustrates
how the prosecutorial discretion inherent in Article 4(a)-based dissemination
provisions may be applied discriminately and demonstrates the Article's poten-
1993]
MINESOTA LAW REVIEW
The prosecutorial history of the Race Relations Act sug-
gests that outsiders are disproportionately prosecuted and con-
victed while dominant group members are acquitted.34
Dominant group members benefit from the listener's familiar-
ity and cultural empathy, which minimize the shock of the
message.35 In cases where the words themselves are ambigu-
ous, the cultural and linguistic history of the outsider will
rarely match that of the judge.3 6
There have been surprisingly few prosecutions under the
Race Relations Act;3 7 the few existing cases demonstrate that
British courts interpret the Act to effectively meet all of Arti-
cle 4(a)'s requirements, including the dissemination prohibi-
tial to prohibit racially charged expression even by an outsider seeking to
demonstrate her minority group's oppression. See supra note 28 for a discus-
sion of Malik.
Malik contended that "the meaning of the words that he had used meant
something different to him as a West Indian than it would have meant to
somebody in [England]." [1968] 1 W.L.R. at 355. In arguing that he had not
intended to stir up hatred, Malik assumed that the audience, and the Court,
would interpret his words the same way he did. Clearly, that perception was
inaccurate.
As a Black Nationalist, Malik chose common and effective words to de-
scribe his plight to a sympathetic audience. That the court rejected his argu-
ment is not surprising. Human nature suggests that a prosecutor may be less
tolerant of a radical message involving race if it comes from a group with
whom she does not empathize, especially if expressed in an unfamiliar and
shocking way. Hence, a prosecutor may target outsiders, while unconsciously
overlooking the equally objectionable messages from members of her own
dominant group, especially if expressed in a comfortable or familiar manner.
34. After Malik's prosecution, four black speakers were convicted and
fined for speeches they gave, while four white members of the Racial Preser-
vation Society were acquitted. HUMAN RIGHTS PAPER No. 2, supra note 17, at
8. For reasons unexplained, the court considered the Society's racist publica-
tion unlikely to stir up racial hatred. Id Similarly, British National Party
Chairman John Kingsley Read was acquitted after being charged with making
an inflammatory speech that appeared to violate the Act. I&i at 9.
35. Similarly, a speaker may use seemingly innocuous "code words" to
communicate a racist message, relying on the listener's familiarity with the
speaker or the speaker's message. See, e.g., Debbie M. Price, Light of a Burn-
ing Cross Flickers on Faces Full of Hate, Cm. TRIB., July 1, 1992, § C17 (com-
menting on the Ku Klux Klan's use of racist "code words").
36. Implicit in the Malik court's reasoning is that the court will evaluate a
message's content according to the listener's interpretation of the words,
rather than the speaker's intended message. [1968] 1 W.L.R. 353 at 357; see
supra note 28 and 34. Hence, the circumstances under which the listener re-
ceives the message determine the value of the speech itself. Because the judge
most likely comes from the dominant group, she will share the dominant lis-
tener's interpretation, rather than the defendant's.
37. HUMAN RIGHTS PAPER No. 2, supra note 17, at 35 n.24 (noting only 19
prosecutions under the Race Relations Act between 1965 and 1975).
[Vol. 77:719
RACIST SPEECH
tion.38 Courts often hold that the dissemination was likely to
stir up racial hatred when such a conclusion seems far-fetched;
worse, courts often apply the Race Relations Act as if it prohib-
ited dissemination of all ideas based on racial superiority.
39
Although the provision prohibiting incitement to racial dis-
crimination is problematic because it may be applied unevenly,
it is a proper component of legislation targeting racial hatred.
The dissemination provision, however, does not balance the
state's legitimate desire to reduce racial hatred against its de-
sire to protect free expression. Hence, it is an intolerable com-
promise of that value.
II. POSITIVE REASONS FOR PROTECTING THE
FREEDOM TO EXPRESS RACIST IDEAS
In addition to the interpretive and practical problems of
Article 4(a) laws,40 two additional criticisms of the provision
must be addressed. Both are grounded in the belief that Arti-
cle 4(a)'s prohibitions are paternalistic: first, society can dis-
cern any existing value in racist speech and reject the message
if there is none; and second, society's communication channels
are such that tolerance tends to neutralize radical messages in-
cluding racial hate.
Racist speech is a subset of fringe or radical dissent and
prohibiting the former unavoidably compromises the latter.
Dissent challenges the status quo and seeks change through
evolution, reformation, or revolution.41 Dissent is necessary,
38. See supra notes 27 and 28 for a discussion of British courts' broad ap-
plication of the Race Relations Act.
39. For example, in The Queen v. Morse, 8 Cr. App. Rep. Sentencing 369
(Eng. C.A. 1986) (LEXIS, Intlaw library, UK case file), the court applied the
incitement provisions of Race Relations Act of 1976 to convict two men for
publishing the British Nationalist, a newspaper that printed racist articles and
cartoons. Id at 369. In reaching its conclusion, the court did not examine the
actual likelihood the British Nationalist would stir up hatred; rather, it pre-
sumed the racist messages had this potential effect. I&i
40. See supra Parts I.A. and I.B.
41. An assumption of this author is that the process through which soci-
ety changes involves opposing forces that challenge each other and ultimately
compromise. Those seeking to alter the status quo challenge those favoring it;
the forces work against each other and end up on some common ground. In
philosophical terms, this perspective views change as a "dialectical" process.
See generally, Dialectic, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 385-89 (Paul
Edwards ed., 2d ed. 1972). A corollary premise is that the more extreme the
challenge to the status quo, the more significant will be the change. This pro-
cess of synthesis represents an important mechanism for change. It begins
when a new idea is introduced which is antithetical--and perhaps shocking-
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perhaps even the catalyst, to force a society to recognize its het-
erogeneity; it protects a diverse society from developing a sin-
gular and monolithic perspective.42 The problem is that racist
hate groups raise voices of dissent no less than other groups
seeking more constructive change.43
Some scholars argue that tolerance of fascist ideas is socie-
tal suicide, because the tolerated groups often seek only repres-
sion. Critics of tolerance fear that ideas can too easily ignite
action. 4 Their attitude reflects a pessimism in a democracy's
ability to reject destructive ideologies. 45
Unfortunately, ambiguous terminology and prosecutorial
discretion chill the expression of all ideas outside the main-
stream, particularly those in the gray zone of radical dissent.
The result is that dissent at the fringes, perhaps the dissent
most capable of effectively challenging the status quo, is
to the status quo. For this reason, even the most extreme viewpoints are valu-
able for their contribution to this process.
42. Herbert Marcuse, Postscript 1968, in A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE
117, 117 (2d prtg. 1969).
43. Like most tools, dissent has the potential to be used for good and bad.
For example, good results when recognition of the outsider's perspective leads
to greater understanding. The bad, however, results when the dominant group
targets the outsider. See Herbert Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in A CRI-
TIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 81, 100 (2d prtg. 1969). For this reason, some schol-
ars argue that tolerance works in favor of repressive regimes because it allows
dissent from the racist right to enter mainstream channels of communication.
I& at 89. The value one places on tolerance, however, depends on one's trust
in society's ability to reject destructive ideologies. Philosopher Herbert Mar-
cuse, in his critique of tolerance, explained that societal progress "must neces-
sarily be a compromise between a variety of opinions ... because there is an
objective truth which can be discovered." I&L
Under Marcuse's theory, the best means of realizing progress is for "all
contesting opinions" to be "submitted to 'the people' for its deliberation and
choice." Id Because Marcuse believed that repressive forces in society control
the channels of communication, he concluded that tolerance was dangerous;
fascist messages could get through while constructive radical dissent could not.
The author disagrees with Marcuse's conclusion.
Of the many scholars who cite the Nazi reign in Germany as proof that
propaganda leads to genocide, few acknowledge that the Weimar Republic had
an anti-hate propaganda law. It is naive to assert that a better-crafted law
could have prevented the horrors of Nazism.
44. See, e.g., id at 109.
45. Id at 94, 110; see also Jones, supra note 6, at 449 (stating "it is indeed
fatuous to expect the successful operation of such a lofty principle [the free
trade of ideas] among mere mortal souls"). These critics believe people are
not capable of choosing constructive ideologies and that the democratic process
does not provide mechanisms that might make this possible. Id at 95. If, how-
ever, people are incapable of choosing for themselves, the alternative is a gov-
ernment that makes choices for them.
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squelched in favor of protection from racist ideas. Some of this
fringe dissent will be racially divisive, but until society receives
its message, its legitimacy cannot be determined. Racist speech
is not the price a society pays for free expression; rather, it is
the price a society pays to hear voices and viewpoints which
challenge it to synthesize diverse perspectives, contributing to
society's progress. 46
Ironically, criminalizing an idea and punishing incitement
to racial hatred may ultimately bolster the racist's cause. By
prohibiting certain types of expression, a society may uninten-
tionally channel those messages into more peripheral and
sometimes dangerous forms.47
Some commentators argue that the best way to control
someone is by giving her the illusion that she is free, or in this
context, tolerated. The freedom to express racist ideas publi-
cally actually may be less effective than an alternative, and per-
haps more shocking underground scheme.48
In the context of racist speech, tolerance can effectively
diffuse a powerful message, in turn strengthening the status
quo.49 Unfortunately, the same tolerance that perpetuates the
status quo and reduces the power of racist fringe movements
also can diffuse messages from constructive fringe move-
ments-that is, desirable dissent.50 This is the point at which
society's capacity to differentiate between the legitimacy of dif-
ferent perspectives determines what messages will be influen-
46. "Progress" may mean many things, but at the very least, it includes an
increasing respect for the worth of each individual.
47. In fact, racist speech laws lend the racist's message the legitimacy of
the legal process and finite judicial resources. In The Queen v. Relf, 1 Cr.
App. Rep. Sentencing 111 (Eng. C.A. 1979) (LEXIS, Intlaw library, UK case
file), for example, the defendant admitted to the police inspector that he and
Relf knew they were violating the Public Order Act: "Yes, that is why we do
it, we're challenging the system." I- See supra note 27 for a discussion of
Relf.
48. Alternative avenues proliferated in the U.K. in the aftermath of the
Race Relations Act of 1965. HuMAN RIGHTS PAPER No. 2, supra note 17, at 8.
For example, after the Act was passed, those interested in such material
formed private racist "book clubs" that were immune from the law. The Act
did not stop people from publishing racist materials; nor did it eliminate the
racist ideas themselves. Instead, it simply channeled racist expression into less
public channels.
49. Marcuse, supra note 43, at 122-23.
50. This analysis incorporates a value judgment, that undesirable dissent
which seeks to oppress others on the basis of their race is qualititatively dis-
tinct from desirable dissent. Although a racist ideology also seeks to change
society, its chief method is the subjugation of others.
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tial. Hopefully, tolerance will diffuse racist expression and not
block equally radical, yet constructive expression.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR MODIFYING ARTICLE 4(a) AS A
MODEL FOR FUTURE RACIST SPEECH LAWS
As countries contemplate racist speech legislation today,
they should consider the problems and compromises that have
attended Article 4(a). Drawing from these experiences, this
Note proposes modifying the Article to ameliorate problems in
its application and to protect free expression from intolerable
intrusion.
A. THE INCITEMENT PROVISION SHOULD BE MODIFIED AND
FAITHFULLY APPLIED
As discussed above, applying the incitement provision has
been problematic because courts have been inconsistent in de-
fining standards of causality, and disingenuous in applying
them to factual circumstances.5 1 The language of Article 4(a)
which makes "incitement to racial discrimination" punishable
should be amended to read "incitement which, given all of the
surrounding circumstances, is substantially likely to cause ra-
cial discrimination."5 2
This higher standard creates a strong presumption in favor
of the speaker's right to communicate her message. Only if
positive evidence convinced a court that a discriminatory act
was substantially likely to result could that presumption be
overcome. 53 This revision requires that the incitement be more
51. See supra notes 27-28 and 39.
52. With this change, Article 4(a) would read, in part:
[State Parties]
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law ... incitement which,
given all of the surrounding circumstances, is substantially likely to
cause racial discrimination, as well as acts of violence or incitement
substantially likely to cause such acts against any race or group of
persons of another colour or ethnic origin ....
53. Under this proposal, if racial discrimination or violence actually oc-
curred, the court must focus on the part of Article 4(a) prohibiting those acts;
the incitement question need not be addressed. If no discrimination or vio-
lence occured, the court's application of the "substantially likely" standard re-
quires it to examine the surrounding circumstances. The court must evaluate
the listener's temporal and spatial proximity to the speaker, the place and
manner of delivery, and the listener's ability to retreat or avoid the message
entirely. The speaker's message must be substantially likely to cause discrimi-
nation. Never, under any application of the incitement provision, should the
application of Article 4(a) depend on the speaker's viewpoint.
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proximate to the discrimination and defines an explicit causal-
ity standard that courts cannot ignore.
This proposed modification makes Article 4(a) more pre-
cise and removes the discretion and potential for abuse inher-
ent in the current version. Moreover, it removes the potential
for disingenuous application by courts seeking to punish an ob-
jectionable message. With this change, the state's power to pro-
scribe the incitement is directly derived from the state's power
to proscribe the resulting discrimination. Incorporation of the
"substantially likely" standard ensures that incitement will be
punished only if resulting discrimination is truly a danger.
B. THE DISSEMINATION PROVISION SHOULD BE DELETED FROM
ARTICLE 4(a)
The dissemination provision of Article 4(a) compromises
principles of free expression and invites an inherently discrimi-
natory application that suppresses the outsider voice.4 Because
these negative aspects greatly outweigh the positive values of
the provision, Article 4(a)'s proscription of "all dissemination of
ideas based on racial superiority or hatred" should be deleted.
Without the dissemination provision, Article 4(a)'s structure is
more cohesive, logical, and effective as a provision banning in-
citement to racial discrimination and violence.
With these changes, Article 4(a) attempts to protect citi-
zens from injury resulting from racial discrimination, when
that injury is the substantially likely result of racist speech.
This proscription applies equally to the racist who seeks to pub-
licly persecute and the political activist who uses racially explo-
sive rhetoric. It allows all speakers, however, freedom to
express their ideas, short of causing discrimination or violence.
When those dangers are not present, the listener's ability to re-
treat or shout back replaces the state's police role. With the
proposed changes the balance shifts to protecting the often val-
uable messages that use racially-divisive language to communi-
cate alienation or subjugation. The state no longer will
paternalistically evaluate the content of a speaker's message.
All groups will communicate using the same channels, where-
upon society's members can accept or reject various ideas as
they wish.
54. See supra Part I.B.
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C. THE PRIVATE HARASSMENT EXCEPTION
Although tolerance generally diffuses the power of the ra-
cist's message, this is not the case when the racist uses hate
speech intentionally to intimidate and injure a specific person
or persons in a private setting. Hence, an overriding exception
to any racist speech law, including Article 4(a) in its current or
modified form, should outlaw this use of racist speech.
Expression employed to harass an individual has no value.
A society's ability to distill the value of any given message pre-
supposes that the message is widely available. When a racist
message is delivered in private, especially when it is directed at
a particular individual, society is unable to evaluate the
message's worth. Absent from the message is any attempt to
convince another of one's ideas.5
The depth of the victim's injury from private, verbal racist
assault is another significant reason to distinguish between pub-
lic and private speech.5 The pain that one suffers as the imme-
diate, intended victim of hate speech may be far more severe
than that of one whose status as a victim results from member-
ship in a historically-oppressed racial group.57
A court should inquire whether a violation of a racist
speech law has occurred by asking whether a conventional law
punishing the intentional injury of another is applicable; if so,
it will usually indicate that the speaker was within the private
harassment exception. In these circumstances, courts need not
consider Article 4(a) laws in any capacity; instead they should
look to the laws that prevent one person from injuring another.
Article 4(a) will provide no refuge for the criminal who trans-
gresses such laws.
55. Even some supporters of an absolutist position on First Amendment
issues concede that private defamation does not deserve protection. See, e.g.,
Alexander Meildejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
REv. 245, 258-59; Jones, supra note 6, at 449. One rationale for this exception
is that private defamation involves no political, governmental, social, or educa-
tional aspect or value whatsoever. Meiklejohn, supra at 257-63.
56. The terror that a person, family or group suffers as the target of racial
hatred has been extensively documented. See generally Richard Delgado,
Words That Wound A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-
Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982). The victim of racial hatred
feels self-hate that can lead to chemical dependency or suicide, as well as hy-
pertension, recurring nightmares, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Mat-
suda, supra note 5, at 2336.
57. A cross burning in a public park is a reminder of racial terror. A cross
burning in an African-American family's front yard, however, conveys more
than racial hatred-it is a specific threat.
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CONCLUSION
Racist speech is different from other forms of expression
that some find objectionable. Hate speech attacks the self-es-
teem of the individual by attempting to humiliate and ostracize
her on account of her immutable characteristics. For that rea-
son, it tests the international community's resolve to punish in-
jurious speech without intolerably infringing upon the right of
all people to freely express their ideas.
Article 4(a) of the Racial Discrimination Convention was
an understandable international response to the genocide that
occurred during World War II and the escalating pace of racist
attacks in the war's aftermath. Yet, with the benefit of histori-
cal perspective, the western democracies that have passed laws
in compliance with Article 4(a) have neither provided greater
security from racist hate speech, nor a tangible tool for improv-
ing race relations. In fact, Article 4(a) laws have criminalized a
segment of expressive activity and placed the discretion to im-
plement its ban in the hands of the state. The jurisprudence
that has developed around these laws has left a trail of confu-
sion about how the laws are to be defined, interpreted, and ap-
plied. Worse, cases interpreting Article 4(a) laws have
demonstrated the state's propensity for applying racist speech
laws against the outsider.
This Note makes four proposals. First, the dissemination
provision should be eliminated from Article 4(a), leaving the
Article as a prohibition of incitement to racial discrimination or
acts of violence. Second, the incitement provision should be
amended to prohibit only incitement substantially likely to
cause racial discrimination or violence. Third, where racist
speech is directed at a specific individual with the intent to in-
jure or intimidate her, an exception should be made to the pro-
tection accorded expression. Most important, legislative bodies
throughout the world should study proposed modifications in
light of the international experience when responding to the
ever-increasing movement to pass laws outlawing racist speech.
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